Do shifting immigration patterns and increased ethnic diversity pose negative consequences for social solidarity and democratic governance in Canadian society? Studies on this subject often implicate the influx of different value systems as potentially upsetting the efficiencies of social and political integration. But very few studies have actually attempted to investigate the value differences between immigrants and native born Canadians. Also, findings from a related line of analysis suggest that shifting immigration patterns and increasing ethnic diversity may not be the only societal transformations to present future challenges for value compatibility within Canadian society. Changing formative and socialization experiences of younger generations may also be contributing to greater value pluralization, and feeding a new generational value divide. Multiple new value divides may now be adding to the overall degree of value diversity that already exists between different socio-cultural groups within the Canadian society. And each of these values divides, new or old, either independently or in some combined fashion, might contribute to making us feel less connected as a society and detract from political support. In this preliminary investigation, data obtained from the 1990 and 2000 Canadian World Values Surveys were employed to probe such broader possibilities. Among other things, the evidence suggests that the generational value divide has a more consistent significant negative effect on various indicators of community connectedness than the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide. In fact, the findings of this investigation indicate that the generational value divide has an even more relevant influence on such outcomes than the French/English value divide, which is striking given the historical significance of this cleavage in Canadian society and politics. Also, the data suggest that the overall degree of value diversity within a community is an important determinant of support for its political authorities, more so than other relevant factors such as democratic and financial satisfaction, public cynicism and even media exposure.
INTRODUCTION
Do shifting immigration patterns and increased ethnic diversity pose consequences for social solidarity and democratic governance in Canadian society? Studies often suggest that the influx of foreign value systems that is attributable to changing immigration trends may have relevant social and political implications (for example, Aizlewood and Pendakur, 2007) 1 . This is certainly 1 It is important to qualify at the outset that a variety of reasons are typically implicated, but differences in value systems are among the most prominent.
plausible. Added value diversity between socio-cultural groups raises the potential for increased variation in competing preferences and demands (Rokeach, 1968) , which may further complicate democratic decision-making and conceivably detract from political support (Easton, 1965; Dalton, 2004) . Also, evidence from other societies suggests that community heterogeneity can have repercussions for social connectedness -leading, for example, to less social interaction and reduced stocks of interpersonal trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Costa Costa and Kahn, 2003) -which Putnam (1993 Putnam ( , 1995a Putnam ( , 1995b Putnam ( , 2000 contends are necessary to foster tighter communities that are more conducive to democratic governance.
To this point, there have been varying interpretations of the implications of more recent changes in Canadian immigration patterns, not all of which have always been negative (Johnston and Soroka, 2001; Banting, 2007a, 2007b; Banerjee, 2007, 2009; Bilodeau and Kanji, 2010) . But very few studies have actually attempted to investigate the value differences between immigrants and native born Canadians. Also, findings from a related line of analysis suggest that shifting immigration trends and increasing ethnic diversity may not be the only societal transformations to present future challenges for value compatibility within Canadian society (Kanji, 2011 (Kanji, , 2008 Kanji and Doyle, 2009; Kanji and Bilodeau, 2006) . For example, changing formative and socialization experiences of younger generations may also be contributing to greater value pluralization and feeding a new generational value divide (Inglehart, 1977; 1990; 1997; Howe, 2010) . For reasons similar to those cited above, this too could have relevant social and political ramifications.
Canada is a longtime immigrant society that has had a great deal of experience contending with the pressures of diversity. It is a country that has historically been a heterogeneous experiment, tested repeatedly by its ethnolinguistic, religious, regional, and class divides. However, multiple new value divides may now be adding to the diverse value mix that already exists between different socio-cultural groups within Canadian society. And each of these value divides, new or old, either independently or in some combined fashion, might contribute to making us feel less connected as a society and detract from political support through their effects.
In this preliminary investigation, I employ data from the 1990 and 2000 Canadian World Values Surveys to begin probing such broader possibilities. In particular, this analysis explores three main questions. First, how do differences in the value systems of immigrants and native born Canadians compare to differences in the value systems between younger and older generations? Second, what does the cross-time evidence suggest about the short-term trajectories of such new value divides? And third, what do the data teach us about the implications of value diversity between different social-cultural groups for social cohesion and people's "specific" support for political authorities (for example, Norris, 1999) ?
Census data and shifting immigration patterns
The place to start is with the census data on immigration. Concern about the effects that more recent immigration trends might have on Canadian society is not without reason. First, the current proportion of immigrants in Canada is considerable (19.8%) -higher now in fact than Kanji 75 it has been in 75 years and growing at a pace that is much faster than the Canadian born population (Chui et al., 2007; Statistics Canada, 2007a; 2008a) 2 . As a potential force of influence and change, it is not inconceivable to see how immigration might be viewed by some as infiltrating (perhaps even somewhat threatening), and not just in terms of population encroachment, but also with respect to its growing relevance for the economy and labour force replacement (for example, Statistics Canada, 2008b) .
Secondly, immigration today is likely more in your face and harder to ignore. Most Canadians now live in closer proximity than in the past. More than 80% of the more than 34 million people that make up the Canadian population live in densely populated urban areas (Statistics Canada, 2007a; . 3 In fact, more than two thirds of Canadians (68%) reside in just 33 heavily populated census metropolitan areas (Statistics Canada, 2007a; . And nearly half of the Canadian population (45%) is concentrated into six major citiesMontreal, Ottawa-Gatineau, Toronto, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver (Statistics Canada, 2007a; .
Virtually all of Canada's immigrants (94.9%), including 97.2% of more recent immigrants also live in urban areas (Chui et al., 2007) . Mostly (63%) in Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal, where they constitute a significant share of the population (Toronto: 45.7%; Vancouver: 39.6%; and Montreal: 20.6%; Chui et al., 2007) . So, even if these newcomers do choose to situate themselves in their own segregated communities, chances are their daily presence is more likely to be felt today than it has in the past. Also, immigrants are more visible now than ever before. For example, in 1996, 11.2% of the Canadian population was a visible minority. By 2006, this proportion had jumped to 16.2% (Statistics Canada, 2008a) , due largely to the changing origins of newcomers.
Third, a greater proportion of recent immigrants to Canada now come from non-traditional (or less familiar) sources which makes them potentially more suspect to some (particularly in the more cautious and extra vigilant post 911 era). For example, in 1971, 61 .6% of immigrants to Canada came from more traditional sources in Europe and 12.1% from Asia (Chui et al., 2007) . By 2006 however, the numbers had basically flipped: 58.3% of immigrants to Canada now come from Asia (sources such as China, India and the Middle East) and 16.1% from Europe (Chui et al., 2007) . In addition, a much smaller, but nonetheless increasing proportion of recent immigrants also come from such non-traditional sources as Central and South America and Africa (Chui et al., 2007) .
A particular concern that is frequently evident in both the literature as well as, in policy making circles is that growing differences in the value systems of immigrants and native born Canadians may pose certain strains down the line (see for example, Aizlewood and Pendakur, 2007) . Such anxieties are also not entirely without substantiation. For instance, there is evidence to suggest that more recent immigrants do in fact come from more value diverse societies (for example, Abramson and Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart, 1997 Inglehart, , 2007 Norris, 2002; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Norris and Inglehart, 2009 for some evidence on how value systems differ worldwide). Also, evidence suggests that early socialization experiences tend to have more durable effects on the formation of people's value systems than experiences that occur later in life (Welzel, 2007) . Such findings are relevant because the average age of Canadian immigrants at arrival is 30 (Statistics Canada, 2007b) , which means that the most impressionable years (Jennings, 2007) for many of these newcomers are likely to have been shaped in profound ways in their value distinct countries of origin. At face value then, it seems sensible to assume that the value systems of more recent immigrants may differ in more significant ways from those of native born Canadians than immigrants from more traditional sources. Also, to the extent that value diversity between immigrants and native born Canadians continues to expand, it is not entirely unreasonable to expect that it may eventually result in consequential outcomes, especially in light of the historical Canadian experience.
But should immigration simply be accepted as the primary concern?
Diversity, Goodhart (2004: 6 of 18) suggests, has effectively become "code for ethnic difference" 4 . This line of thinking, however, to the extent that it has in fact become conventional wisdom, may be too restrictive and possibly even misleading, particularly when it comes to grappling with and planning for future challenges. Even though changing immigration patterns and increasing ethnic diversity are important societal transformations that should be carefully investigated and better understood, it is equally important to keep in mind that the socio-cultural mix of Canadian society has been shifting in a variety of ways, and that there may be other forces of change that could also have important implications down the line. In a similar vein, it is also important to remember that changes in the value composition of a society need not always be imported. They may also be sparked from within.
For example, there are compelling reasons to suppose that the value systems of younger and older generations in Canada have been gradually shifting further apart (Nevitte, 1996; Howe, 2010) . This theory, at its core, "is linked with changing existential conditionsabove all, the change from growing up with the feeling that survival is precarious, to growing up with the feeling that survival can be taken for granted" (Inglehart, 2007: 223-224) . Socioeconomic development within advanced industrial societies such as Canada, according to Inglehart's (1977 Inglehart's ( , 1990 Inglehart's ( , 1997 now well-known perspective on postmodern value change, has contributed to a broad-based shift in the value orientations of younger generations. Older generations, because they were raised and socialized under conditions of much less physical security, tend to focus more on making ends meet and adhere to traditional cultural norms. Younger generations, because they are generally less preoccupied with their physical security, are less likely to be constantly concerned with making ends meet, and more inclined to emphasize post-material concerns such as self expression and the quality of life. Thus, similar to the distinct cultural baggage of more recent immigrants, it is entirely conceivable that the changing formative and socialization experiences of younger generations may also be contributing to diversifying the value mix within Canadian society (Welzel, 2007) .
This plausibility is further bolstered by its theoretical connection to higher education levels and the information explosion (Inglehart, 2007; Welzel, 2007; Dalton, 2006; Clark and Rempel, 1997) . Both of these developments are believed to have helped expose younger generations to more information and different ideas, thereby expanding their ways of thinking and also influencing their value systems in ways that are distinct from older cohorts. And evidence suggests that each of these advancements has taken place in the Canadian case. For instance, Canada stands out among other OECD countries as one of the most highly educated societies in the world (Statistics Canada, 2008c) . Also, the 2006 Canadian Census shows that more than a majority (60%) of Canadians within the 25 to 64 age group now have some form of post-secondary education, compared to about 25% who have a high school diploma and 15% who have less than a high school level of education (Statistics Canada, 2008c) . This is different from the way that things once were. Moreover, the data clearly suggest that it is younger Canadians who are driving this shift. The proportion of young Canadians (29%) aged 25 to 34 with a university degree is greater than the proportion of 55 to 64 year olds (18%) who have a university degree (Statistics Canada, 2008c) . Also, 55 to 64 year olds are not as likely (23%) to have completed their high school education as 25 to 34 year olds (11%) (Statistics Canada, 2008c) .
In addition, Internet use in Canada is also more prevalent now than in the past. This has made it easier to both instantly access a wide spectrum of information and communicate (Veenhof, 2006) . The data indicate that younger and middle aged Canadians are not all that different when it comes to having access to this technology. However, there is a marked difference when it comes to use. The evidence shows that more than 43% of young Canadians aged 16 to 25 use information technology at home for an average of one or more hours a day and this does not include the time spent on computers in other places such as school and work (Veenhof, 2006) . By contrast, Canadians who are in their late 30s or older are much more likely to be casual users, investing no more than 20 minutes per day (Veenhof, 2006) . Also, evidence shows that young people are more likely to use the Internet for purposes such as education and training (Veenhof, 2006) . These data lend further support to the proposition that younger generations are probably more exposed on a daily basis to a diverse array of information and ideas than older generations.
Furthermore, there are at least two other developments which lead me to expect that the values of younger generations are likely shifting in ways that are different from their parents and grandparents. The first has to do with changing household and family structures. It would be difficult to deny that living environments and families can have a significant influence when it comes to socializing younger generations. Evidence suggests that these important socializing agents are also no longer the same as they once were. For one thing, the typical Canadian household is a lot smaller today than it used to be in the past (Milan et al., 2007) , which means that the mix of immediate socializing agents has changed. Also, there is much more variety in what constitutes a family today than was once the case.
For instance, the proportion of married couples with children has declined considerably from 49.4% in the mid 1980's to 34.6% in 2006 (Milan et al., 2007) . The proportion of children 14 and under living with married parents (65.7%) has also declined since 1986 (81.2%) (Milan et al.,2007) . Alternatively, the proportion of common law couples with kids has increased from 2.7% in 1986 to 6.8% in 2006 (Milan et al., 2007) . The proportion of lone parents (15.9%) is higher than in the past (Milan et al., 2007) . And same sex married couples are now more prevalent and are more likely to have children (Milan et al., 2007) . All of these changes lead me to believe that the early socialization experiences that are likely to shape the value systems of younger generations today are probably not the same as generations past, which in turn also feeds the plausibility of an expanding intergenerational value divide.
Secondly, the influence of institutionalized religion (once seen as being a towering socializing agent) in Canadians' lives has declined. Evidence from Statistics Canada (Clark and Schellenberg, 2006) suggests that the proportion of Canadians 15 and older reporting no religious affiliation from 1985 to 2004 has nearly tripled from 7 to 19% 5 . Also, the proportion of Canadians who indicate that they did not attend any religious services in the previous year has increased from 19 to 25% (Clark and Schellenberg, 2006) . Furthermore, evidence indicates that older generations are more likely to engage in 5 Also see Appleyard (2011) .
Kanji 77 religious activities on their own than younger generations (Clark and Schellenberg, 2006) . And older generations are more likely to place a high degree of importance on religion in their life than younger generations (Clark and Schellenberg, 2006) . Perhaps the most striking piece of evidence in this regard suggests that the proportion of 15 to 29 year olds in 2004 who had no religious affiliation or did not attend religious services was more than 50% and even higher in provinces such as British Columbia (Clark and Schellenberg, 2006) . This too likely has relevant consequences when it comes to differentiating the value systems of younger and older generations.
So why are diverging value divides concerning anyway?
The reasons that lead to expectations of increased levels of value diversity between immigrants and native born Canadians and younger and older generations are distinct from the reasons that raise concerns about their potential consequences. For instance, evidence from other societies suggests that increased value diversity between different socio-cultural groups may pose significant implications for social cohesion, particularly when it comes to levels of interpersonal trust and social interaction, which in turn may affect mass support for politics. Research in the past has shown that "more homogeneous communities have a higher level of social interactions…" (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000: 849; Costa and Kahn, 2003) . The reason, Costa and Khan (2003: 103-104) argue, is that most people "tend to self aggregate. They prefer to interact with others like them because of shared interests, socialization to the same cultural norms, and greater empathy toward individuals who remind them of themselves". Also, the same evidence suggests that "such communities generate more social capital." And abundant stocks of social capital, mean higher levels of interpersonal trust, which Putnam (1993 Putnam ( , 1995a Putnam ( , 1995b Putnam ( , 2000 Putnam ( , 2002 claims lead to better social cohesion and greater confidence in government institutions. Why? Because more trusting societies are more likely to "value solidarity, civic participation and integrity" -virtues that help foster social connectedness, make democracy work, and facilitate government performance (Putnam, 2000: 345) .
Also, for democratic governments, a major challenge involves making complex legislative and policy decisions while taking into account competing needs and preferences within their societies (Verba, 2003) . To the extent that values serve as reasonable approximations of citizens' demands (Rokeach, 1968) , increased value diversity between different socio-cultural groups may make it more difficult for democratic governments to reconcile and respond to competing interests. And as the potential for citizens to be on the losing end of legislative and policy decisions increases, so do the chances that they may be more dissatisfied with politics (Easton, 1965) . As Dalton (2004: 195) describes it: "the increasing dimensionality and complexity of policy space create the potential for more citizens to feel that government is not sufficiently addressing their concerns". Putnam's (2007: 149) most recent work on this subject informs our expectations even further by suggesting that people in diverse contexts neither bridge across divides nor bond within their own groups -at least not in the short-term. In other words, both out-group and in-group interactions and trust are likely to be lower in more diverse societies, as diversity triggers "not in-group/outgroup division, but anomie or social isolation". This suggests that for a short period, the social and political implications of increased value diversity in Canadian society may be even more severe than suggested above. People in diverse circumstances, according to Putnam's latest research, tend to "hunker down" and withdraw from collective life, conventional politics and have less confidence in government and politicians. Moreover, If Putnam is right, then it also stands to reason that more value diverse societies may have weaker ties to community, and expressions of societal pride and identity may also suffer as a result.
To this point, the Canadian evidence relating to the social and political effects of diversity has been relatively mixed and based primarily on the study of immigrants. For example, Banerjee (2007, 2009) report that more recent immigrants face tough challenges in that they have low incomes, experience great poverty and perceive discrimination. And while some of these conditions may improve over time, perceptions of discrimination appear to get worse. Additionally, evidence presented by Reitz and Banerjee suggests that visible minorities do not integrate as well into Canadian society as other immigrants, particularly when it comes to adopting the Canadian identity, acquiring citizenship and voting. Moreover, their difficulties tend to linger and deteriorate as opposed to improve over time. Studies such as these have already led some to seriously question the future prospects of increased ethnic diversity and to suggest that this "can have troubling consequences for national identity" (Gregg, 2006: 4 of 4) .
Others such as Banting (2007a, 2007b) interpret the evidence in a more positive light. Their analyses also examine various social and political measures, such as indicators of pride, belonging, interpersonal trust, social values, social networks and political participation. Their data however, suggest that while there are differences between newcomers to Canada and Canadians of British and European decent, with few exceptions, most of the findings are not very robust. Moreover, Soroka and his colleagues contend that the more time that recent immigrants spend in Canada, the more integrated they are likely to become. According to these researchers, the bigger challenge remains in integrating more historic communities such as the French and the Aboriginals.
Amid these varying interpretations and viewpoints, a key point on which most researchers seem to agree is that we still have much to learn about the workings, dynamics and effects of diversity (for example, Putnam, 2007; Reitz and Banerjee, 2007; Johnston et al., 2010) . Some have even suggested that there "is a need to measure diversity more sensitively…" (Harell and Stolle, 2010:249 ) . To date, most of the empirical findings relating to community heterogeneity have been based simply on the demographic composition of societiesfocusing primarily on income inequalities and growing differences in race and ethnicity due to increased geographic mobility and migration. This type of analysis basically assumes that demographic characteristics serve as proxies for people's differing value systems. But people with different demographic backgrounds do not always differ in the way that they think about and view the world. And as a consequence, certain socio-cultural divides may be more value diverse than others (Kanji and Doyle, 2009; Kanji and Bilodeau, 2006) . More importantly, all of this could have implications for the resulting effects that value divides have on society and politics. It is for reasons such as these that in this investigation I aim to focus more squarely on value diversity as measured by the degree of value differences that exist between different socio-cultural groups.
Also, despite the fact that some have made passing reference to the possibility that immigration and ethnic differences are likely only one aspect of the total "diversity story" (Goodhart, 2004: 6 of 18; Putnam, 2007) , to this point very few empirical analyses have actually bothered to compare the immigrant/native born Canadian divide to other societal divides 6 . For example, how do value differences between younger and older generations compare to the immigrant/native born Canadian value divide? Have both these value divides been expanding at similar rates over time? And do these value divides have varying or similar social and political consequences? In addition, because Canada has historically been a deeply divided society, it is important to give some broader consideration to how the effects of such newer value divides compare to the effects of various older value divides (such as the ethno-linguistic, religious, regional and class divides). Moreover, how does the combined influence of value divides compare to their independent effects? In this analysis, I attempt to probe some of these unknowns.
Data and measures
Examining value systems and value diversity is not without its complications and it inevitably requires making various choices. First, looking empirically at a broad array of values, comparing values between different socio-cultural groups within a population, tracking value diversity trajectories across time, and examining the implications of value differences between different socio-cultural groups for social cohesion and democratic governance requires a data source that ideally is capable of living up to all of these demands. The Canadian version of the World Values Surveys (WVS) contains several hundred variables, many of which are designed specifically to measure beliefs, attitudes, opinions and behaviours across a variety of social, economic and political domains. With this data source, it is possible to investigate a wide spectrum of value orientations, the specifics of which are outlined in greater detail below. Also, because the WVS utilize standardized questionnaires that retain several indicators that have been probed repeatedly across multiple points in time, it is also possible to track value dynamics over time. In addition, because the WVS are rigorously tested and typically randomly administered, they provide reliable and generally robust aggregate sample sizes for analysis. In fact, more recent versions of the Canadian WVS even include boosted samples of more recent immigrants from non-traditional source countries. Both of these features make it possible to conduct more detailed lines of investigation that would otherwise not be very meaningful.
7 As well, the WVS offer the ability to test associations between group differences in value orientations, social cohesion and political support as various theoretically relevant measures of both of these latter concepts are also incorporated within these survey instruments.
Second, because scholars define values differently, there is currently no standard conceptualization to which everyone adheres.
Values are also inherently difficult to analyze empirically because they cannot be observed directly. This means that once an appropriate data source had been decided upon, there is also a need to settle on an approach for measuring values. The strategy that I use in this investigation is similar to the one that is employed by our European counterparts. It assumes that values are embedded in how people think, in what they say and in how they act, and that they need to be treated analytically as hypothetical constructs and used heuristically (van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995) . This approach conceives of values as being the underlying mechanisms that structure people's beliefs, attitudes, opinions and behaviours. And it suggests that through patterns in people's responses to survey questionnaires may be one way of getting at value orientations.
As such, I began my investigation by selecting more than 100 comparable indicators from the 1990 and 2000 Canadian WVS and subjecting them to an exploratory factor analysis. I used this approach to dig for consistent signs of underlying value patterns in 7 The sample sizes for the 1990 and 2000 Canadian WVS are 1,730 and 1,931 respectively. Moreover, the 2000 round of the Canadian WVS includes a supplementary survey of recent immigrants -The New Immigrant Survey (NIS) -intended specifically for conducting more detailed analyses of Canada's immigrant population. As with most random surveys of the Canadian population, the core sample of Canadian respondents interviewed for the 2000 WVS includes a number of participants who were not born in Canada (n = 380). The limitation with such samples, however, is that they often underestimate Canada's real immigrant population, and do not provide the best representation of more recent immigrants from non-traditional source countries. In most every aspect, the basic features of the core WVS and the NIS are essentially similar: both surveys contain the same questions, which are listed in the same order, and they implement the same preamble and response metrics. The only differences are that the NIS respondents were given a choice of language of interview -either French, English or Cantonese/Mandarin, and they were randomly selected only from three major urban centres -Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal. The overall effect of the NIS is to add another 563 immigrants to the 665 immigrants already sampled as part of the core surveys conducted in 1990 and 2000, and to boost the proportion of more recent immigrants who have been in Canada for only a short time and who have come from non-traditional source countries. Nineteen percent of respondents in the NIS sample report that they have lived in Canada for less than two years, 26% have been in Canada for three to five years, 24% indicate that they have lived in Canada for six to ten years and 31% immigrated ten or more years ago.
Kanji 79 people's survey responses. 8 The indicators that I chose centred on a variety of potentially contentious subject matters (such as religion, morals and ethics, work, the family, the economy and technological advancements, and other postmodern topics such as the environment) which I felt were likely to bring out some of the most fundamental distinctions in people's value systems.
9
The findings are reported in the Appendix (Table 1) and have served as a common point of departure in many of the preliminary analyses that the author and his colleagues have conducted to date (for example, Kanji and Doyle, 2009; Kanji and Bilodeau, 2006) .
10
They suggest that Canadians organize their survey responses independently 11 across different domains as well as distinctly within domains. For example, religious orientations cluster separately from family orientations, which cluster independently work orientations and so on. Also, different indicators relating to faith cluster in precise ways, as do different sets of orientations toward work, and so on. These results reveal the systematic manner in which Canadians responded to a significant sample of 1990 and 2000 Canadian WVS questions. The forces that we believe to be responsible for structuring their survey responses are values. And what these findings suggest is that Canadians' value systems likely operate in diverse and intricate ways. For instance, in the religious domain we find indications of at least three distinct value patterns, represented by three different dimensions of associated survey responses. The first unites basic orientations toward religiosity. The second combines measures relating to the perceived adequacy of church leadership. And the third integrates variables dealing with perceptions of afterlife.
In terms of moral and ethical values, two key dimensions emerge. The first -moral permissiveness -unites outlooks toward abortion, divorce, homosexuality, prostitution, euthanasia and suicide. The second -civil permissiveness -integrates orientations toward civic misconduct and behaviours such as claiming unentitled government benefits, avoiding a fare on public transport, accepting a bribe and cheating on taxes. In the family domain, we find signs of three distinct value patterns. The first integrates orientations toward single parenting. The second brings together perceptions toward women and work. And the third centres on child-rearing and specifically whether children should be encouraged to be independent or obedient.
The subsequent three dimensions attempt to capture values toward economic and technological progress. The first combines measures relating to market economics. The second brings together perceptions on economic fairness. And the third integrates measures relating to technology development and scientific advancement. When it comes to values toward work, there are at least five separate value patterns that appear, due in large part to the fact that the WVS are especially rich and diverse in indicators that measure outlooks toward work. The first combines perceptions toward various workplace conditions, such as the number of hours involved, the amount of holiday time available, the level of pay to be received and the extent of pressure entailed. The second unites outlooks toward following instructions at work and employee involvement in workplace decision-making. The third dimension integrates people's orientations toward higher level workplace motivations, such as the opportunity to use personal initiative, derive a feeling of achievement, use abilities and take on responsibility. The fourth shows linkages between orientations toward money and work more generally. And the fifth dimension brings together outlooks toward hard work and determination.
Lastly, in terms of postmodern values, we find three main patterns. The first unites people's outlooks toward giving financially to the environmental cause, the second, friends and leisure, and the third, various materialist and post-materialist tendencies (Inglehart, 1977 (Inglehart, , 1990 (Inglehart, , 1997 .
FINDINGS The evidence on new value divides
With these 19 sample measures in hand, the next three steps in my analysis were to: first, probe for signs of value differences between native born Canadians and more recent immigrants from non-traditional source countries;
12 second, compare that evidence to the findings for other potential new value divides such as the generational value divide; and third, assess the crosstime data for any indications of short-term trajectories and prospective narratives. As expected, the evidence does indeed suggest that immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians differ in significant ways on certain core values. But the results reported in Table 1 are not as consistent (either across time or within domains) as one might expect given the focus of attention that immigration typically receives. Similar to the sorts of conclusions reached by his colleagues (2007a, 2007b) , this may suggest that value differences between these two groups are not all that distinct. 13 In order to be more concrete, however, we need to look more closely at the evidence.
Beginning with religious values, the 1990 data presented in Table 1 indicate that native born Canadians and immigrants from non-traditional source countries were essentially indistinguishable in their outlooks toward religiosity. But by 2000, the evidence suggests that immigrants from non-traditional source countries were much more likely (42%) than native born Canadians (26%) to express multiple indications of being religious. Conversely, the 1990 evidence shows that immigrants from non-traditional source countries (50%) were more likely than native born Canadians (35%) to feel that the leadership of their religious institutions on various family, moral, social and spiritual problems was adequate. By 2000 however, these differences were no longer statistically significant. And when it comes to views on afterlife, neither the 1990 nor 2000 evidence shows any 12 By non-traditional source countries, I mean countries other than the United States and those that fall outside of Europe. 13 It is possible, of course, that some of these cross-time inconsistencies might be partly explained by smaller sample sizes of immigrants in 1990 than 2000. To test this speculation further, down the road, will require additional data. The inconsistencies from one domain to the next, however, are more difficult to simply brush aside for similar methodological reasons. They suggest that these findings and their implications deserve at least some consideration.
significant discrepancies between these two groups. With respect to religious values therefore, the most recent evidence suggests that these two groups are in fact more similar than diverse. Immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians may differ significantly on the degree to which they value religion, but the extent to which they value religious leadership and the notion of afterlife is practically the same.
In terms of moral and ethical values, the cross-time findings consistently suggest that native born Canadians are more morally permissive than immigrants from nontraditional source countries. Both the 1990 and 2000 evidence demonstrates that native born Canadians are significantly more inclined to tolerate behaviours such as abortion, divorce, homosexuality, prostitution, euthanasia and suicide, than immigrants from non-traditional source countries. About four in five native born Canadians view one or more of these behaviours as more justifiable than not, whereas only three in five immigrants from nontraditional source countries share these same views. When it comes to civic misconduct and the civil permissiveness dimension however, the cross-time evidence shows no significant differences. Thus, with regards to moral and ethical values, the data point to indications of both value differences and similarities, but again no consistent signs of value diversity.
In the family domain, I find evidence of value differences over single parenting and approaches to child-rearing but not on the issue of women and work. For instance, despite the fact that differences on this dimension were insignificant in 1990, the 2000 evidence indicates that nearly three in five native born Canadians (58%) are acceptant of single parenting, whereas only two in five (41%) immigrants from non-traditional source countries hold these same views. Similarly, the 2000 data show that nearly half of native born Canadians (49%) believe that it is more important for children to learn about independence as opposed to obedience and only 34% of immigrants from non-traditional source countries feel this same way. When it comes to orientations toward women and work, however, the 1990 data suggest that immigrants from non-traditional source countries were at one point significantly more likely to support the idea of women working (63%) than native born Canadians (49%). But in 2000, differences on this dimension were statistically insignificant.
Turning next to the economy and technological progress, the evidence provides very few indications of value differences. In 1990, there was some evidence to suggest that native born Canadians were significantly more supportive of private ownership and economic competition than immigrants from non-traditional source countries. At that time, three in four native born Canadians (76%) expressed support for these core principles of market economics as compared to 66% of immigrants from non-traditional source countries. By 2000, however, differences on this dimension were no longer statistically significant. Likewise, the dimension Even in the work domain, the results indicate that native born Canadians and immigrants from non-traditional source countries are more alike in their outlooks than different, which again points to more value similarity than dissimilarity. For instance, data from both 1990 and 2000 indicate that the two groups are not significantly different when it comes to their views on workplace conditions and participation. Similarly, immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians are not significantly different when it comes to their outlooks toward other higher level workplace motivations or the importance that they place on money and work more generally. The only dimension on which these two groups do differ significantly is on orientations toward teaching children about hard work.
The findings in this case are consistent across both time points and they suggest that immigrants from non-traditional source countries value hard work more than native born Canadians. In 1990, 32% of immigrants from non-traditional source countries felt that it was important for their children to learn about hard work as opposed to other motivational attributes such as determination. The comparable figure for native born Canadians was 23%. In 2000, 41% of immigrants from non-traditional source countries thought that it was important for their children to learn about hard work, whereas the corresponding finding for native born Canadians was 28%.
Lastly, in terms of postmodern values, there are no signs of significant differences between native born Canadians and immigrants from nontraditional source countries on either their willingness to contribute financially toward environmental protection or their orientations toward friends and leisure. In fact, the only significant difference in this domain emerges on the materialist/post-materialist dimension. In particular, evidence from 2000 shows that native born Canadians are significantly more likely to be postmaterialist in their outlooks than immigrants from non-traditional source countries. That is, slightly slightly more than one in four (28%) native born Canadians place a greater importance on "giving people more say on government decisions" and "protecting freedom of speech" than "maintaining order in the nation" and "fighting rising prices". The comparable figure for immigrants from non-traditional source countries is 18%. In all, therefore, the findings from this domain suggest that these two groups differ in the extent to which they value general post materialist tendencies, but not specifically in the degree to which they value protecting the environment or friends and leisure.
The analysis reported in Table 2 is similar to the one presented in Table 1 , except that it compares the values of older (pre-1945) and younger (post-1960) generations.
14 The first point to note is that these findings are clearly much more consistent (both across time and within domains) than the results reported in Table 1 . For instance, the cross-time evidence relating to religious values shows two stable discrepancies. The first suggests that older generations are significantly more religious than younger generations. In fact, the most recent evidence on this dimension indicates that older generations are nearly two times more religious (39%) than younger generations (20%). The second discrepancy suggests that older generations are also much more likely than younger generations to believe that religious leadership gives adequate answers to family, moral, social and spiritual problems. The most recent evidence in this case indicates that 36% of older generations adhere to this view as compared to 23% of younger generations. When it comes to orientations toward afterlife, however, the cross-time data consistently indicate that older and younger generations do not differ significantly on this particular dimension. Taken together then, the findings pertaining to the religious domain suggest that younger and older generations of Canadians differ in the extent to which they value religion and religious leadership, but not afterlife. Moreover, when compared to Table 1 , these results also suggest that younger and older generations have more religious value differences than immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians.
In terms of moral and ethical values, the results point again to two consistent cross-time discrepancies. The first indicates that younger generations are more inclined to justify behaviours such as abortion, divorce, homosexuality, prostitution, euthanasia and suicide. The most recent evidence shows that 83% of younger generations are morally permissive as compared to 70% of older generations. In addition, the evidence also demonstrates 14 The justification for the two groups that I use to measure the generational value divide is grounded in the logic of Inglehart's theory of inter-generational value change (1977; 1990; 1997) . Post-war generations, because of their different formative and socialization experiences during more affluent existential circumstances, are likely to have distinct value orientations from those raised during more depressed pre World War II times. Moreover, the 1960s were when such differences in values first began to get noticed and documented.
Kanji 83 that younger generations are more permissive of civil disobedience than older generations. That is, they are more inclined to justify claiming unentitled government benefits, avoiding a fare on public transport, accepting a bribe and cheating on taxes. The most recent evidence in this case shows that younger generations are nearly three times more permissive (23%) of civil misconduct than older generations (8%). On the whole, the evidence from this domain suggests that younger generations value morals and ethics less than older generations. Also, it suggests that younger and older generations have more significant value discrepancies on such matters than immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians. With respect to family values, both the 1990 and 2000 data indicate that younger generations are more likely to be supportive of single parenting than older generations. The most recent evidence on this front shows that nearly 70% of younger generations support this approach to parenting. But only 38% of older generations share this view. When it comes to teaching children about independence as opposed to obedience, however, the cross-time evidence is less consistent. The 1990 findings indicate that younger generations (43%) were at one point significantly more inclined to support this approach to child rearing than older generations (29%). But by 2000, this difference was no longer statistically significant. And both the 1990 and 2000 findings indicate that younger generations are more supportive of women working than older generations. The most recent evidence shows that 64% of younger generations back this view as compared to 56% of older generations. Overall, the findings for this domain suggest that younger generations value single parenting and women working more than older generations. And even though the most recent results in this domain suggest that younger and older generations have no more value differences than immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born countries, the ways in which younger and older generations differ on family values is more varied.
On values toward economic and technological progress, there are both fewer discrepancies and not as much consistency, which on the whole is not very different from what the findings in Table 1 suggest about immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians. For example, in 1990 the results indicate that older generations (77%) were significantly more supportive of market economics than younger generations (70%). But by 2000, any inter-generational differences on this dimension were hardly noticeable.
Furthermore, unlike immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians, both the 1990 and 2000 findings for younger and older generations consistently indicate that the two are not statistically distinguishable when it comes to orientations toward technology and scientific advancements. However, on orientations toward economic fairness I do find consistent cross-time differences, whereas immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians showed no signs of being distinct on this particular dimension. Both the evidence from 1990 and 2000 indicates that younger generations are more supportive of greater income equality and personal responsibility than older generations. More specifically, the most recent evidence for this dimension shows that 27% of younger generations support these positions, as compared to 21% of older generations. This suggests that the former value this particular understanding of economic fairness more so than the latter. And the evidence overall indicates that younger and older generations have the same number of value differences in this domain as native born Canadians and immigrants from non-traditional source countries. Turning now to consider the evidence relating to values toward work, no significant differences were found between younger and older generations on the workplace conditions and motivations dimensions. However, when it comes to workplace participation, the findings consistently indicate that younger generations are more inclined to support worker involvement in workplace decision-making than older generations. The most recent evidence suggests that 25% of younger generations support this proposition as compared to 17% of older generations. In addition, with respect to orientations toward money and work, the 1990 evidence suggests that these two groups were at one point not all that different. The 2000 findings however, indicate that younger generations (66%) are significantly more likely than older generations (43%) to favour placing less importance on money and work in the future. Similarly, when it comes to teaching children about hard work, the 1990 evidence shows no significant differences. In 2000 however, the results suggest that older generations (31%) are significantly more likely to place a greater importance on teaching children about hard work than younger generations (24%). In all, these findings suggest that younger generations value involvement in workplace decision-making more so than older generations. But they also generally value work and money less. And compared to similar findings for immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians, the most recent evidence for younger and older generations points to much more diversity when it comes to values toward work.
Lastly, with respect to postmodern values, the evidence suggests that younger and older generations did not differ significantly on their orientations toward environmental protection in 1990. However, in 2000, the evidence shows that younger generations (28%) are significantly more likely than older generations (20%) to want to support the environmental cause financially. Likewise, the 1990 findings show no significant differences between young and old on the materialism/post-materialism battery. However, the 2000 data indicate that younger generations (31%) are significantly more likely than older generations (24%) to be post-materialist in their outlooks. Also, the evidence from 1990 indicates that older generations (69%) were significantly more likely than younger generations (61%) to prioritize friends and leisure. But by 2000, this difference was no longer significant. All together, the most recent findings in this domain suggest that younger generations value environmental protection and post-materialist tendencies more than older generations. They also suggest that younger and older generations have more value differences in this domain than immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians.
The findings reported in Table 3 summarize how value differences between immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians compare in relation to the generational value divide and the more classic native born Canadian/immigrant from traditional source countries value divide. These results are telling in several respects.
First, they verify that native born Canadians and more recent immigrants from non-traditional source countries have more value differences than native born Canadians and immigrants from traditional sources such as Europe and the United States. Based on a comparison of the same 19 dimensions assessed in Tables 1 and 2 , the evidence suggests that the proportion of significant value discrepancies between native born Canadians and more recent immigrants from non-traditional source countries was about 21% greater than between native born Canadians and immigrants from traditional sources in 1990 and about 26% greater in 2000. Note however, that the degree of value diversity between immigrants and native born Canadians pales in comparison to the extent of value diversity that exists on the generational value divide. For both time points, the evidence consistently suggests that younger and older generations have many more value differences than immigrants and native born Canadians. Also, these data consistently suggest that despite their differences, immigrants and native born Canadians generally have more values in common than not. Younger and older generations, on the other hand, have more value differences than similarities. In 1990, the evidence indicates that older and younger generations differed significantly on nearly 58% of the dimensions compared. And in 2000, the total proportion of significant differences was even higher (63%).
Second, the evidence in Table 3 consistently suggests that the distribution of significant value discrepancies on both the native born Canadian-immigrant from nontraditional source countries value divide and the generational value divide is broad-based. In both cases, significant discrepancies were detected across a majority of the value domains examined. This was not the case, however, for the native born Canadian/immigrant from traditional source countries value divide. In addition, the average size of the value discrepancies detected on the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide and the generational value divide was relatively similar and consistently larger than the average size of the value discrepancies found on the native born Canadian/immigrant from traditional source countries value divide. In these two respects, then, the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide and the generational value divide appear more alike than different. This suggests that value differences on both of these divides are varied and potentially equally difficult to reconcile. Third, the cross-time evidence consistently suggests that value diversity in Canada is on the rise. At this stage, however, we need to be cautious about how far we stretch these results as they are based on only two time points and a fairly short timeframe. Still, what these data show is that during the 1990s, the total number of significant discrepancies on all three of the value divides examined increased, as did the average size of those gaps. The magnitude of these shifts suggests that changes in value diversity are likely occurring gradually. However, there are also reasons to suppose that certain value divides may expand more swiftly than others. For example, the total number of significant discrepancies on the native-born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide increased by 2 and widened by an average of 1.5% between 1990 and 2000. In the case of the other two value divides -the native born Canadian/immigrant from traditional source countries value divide and the generational value dividethe cross-time changes were not as large. In each of these latter two cases, the evidence suggests that the total number of significant value gaps increased by 1 and the average size of those gaps increased by 1%.
The difference in the pace of change between the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide and the generational and native born Canadian/immigrant from traditional source countries value divides may be influenced by the more recent influx of immigrants from non-traditional source countries. For this reason, it is conceivable that the rate of growth of the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide might gradually decelerate with the passage of time as the proportion of immigrants from more diverse sources begins to stabilize and once these immigrants have been in the country for longer periods of time, possibly due to acculturation. That said however, other evidence reported in Table 3 indicates that a strong majority of the discrepancies detected on all three value divides are newly emerging gaps, which were not evident during 1990 and until 2000. Moreover, the proportion of such newly emerging discrepancies is greater on the immigrant/native born Canadian value divides than on the generational value divide. The combination of these findings suggests that in the short-term, the native born Canadian/ immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide may continue to contribute more heavily to the growing complexity of Canada's socio-cultural value mix than other value divides. However, it would be necessary would be necessary to examine data from more time points and for other value divides before we can be more certain about the accuracy of this and any other future projections. Fourth, the final three columns reported in Table  3 summarize additional evidence which also points to more indications of value divergence than convergence. On all three value divides, the proportion of dimensions on which differences in values are expanding across time is consistently greater than the proportion of dimensions on which value discrepancies are becoming more alike. The evidence for both native born Canadian/immigrant value divides shows that the proportion of diverging discrepancies detected is at least double the proportion of converging gaps. Moreover, the proportion of diverging value discrepancies detected between native born Canadians and immigrants from non-traditional source countries (36.8%) is more than three times greater than the proportion of diverging discrepancies detected on the native born Canadian /immigrant from traditional source countries value divide (10.5%).
Notice however, that the proportion of diverging value discrepancies between different generations (42.1%) is even greater. And even though the cross-time evidence for the generational value divide indicates a higher degree of value convergence than either of the native born Canadian/ immigrant value divides, on nearly 60% of these dimensions, the data also suggest that value discrepancies between generations still remain significant despite having converged during the 1990s, which is not the case on either of the native born Canadian/immigrant value divides. This preliminary evidence may lend some support to Soroka et al.'s (2007a Soroka et al.'s ( , 2007b claim that immigrants are likely to acculturate into Canadian society over time. And it may also reveal something interesting about the longevity of generational value differences relative to those between immigrants and native born Canadians. At this stage, however, it is difficult to be more certain as much more longitudinal evidence and detailed investigation is still required 15 .
Value diversity, social cohesion and democratic governance The next step in my analysis was to examine whether value differences between socio-cultural groups have any direct implications for social social cohesion and democratic governance. The evidence in Table 4 begins by examining the effects of value diversity on interpersonal trust. More specifically, Model 1 in this table compares the effects of various new and old value divides within Canadian society, such as the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide, the native born Canadian/ immigrant from traditional source countries value divide, the generational value divide and the French/English value divide. 16 Although this is not a comprehensive analysis of all the value divides that likely exist within Canadian society, it is an exploratory first step that takes us beyond what has been examined in the past. And the results seem to suggest the need for further reflection and additional analysis. For instance, the findings of this investigation indicate that value differences between native born Canadians and immigrants from nontraditional source countries are not directly linked to the amount of trust that Canadians place in other people, nor for that matter, do they even seem to detract from interpersonal trust. By contrast, both the generational and French/English value divides appear to have significant negative effects. Communities with high levels of value diversity attributable to the generational and French/English divides are on average less likely to be trusting of others.
17 Note too, that the generational value divide has an even more powerful effect than the French/ English value divide. This is a particularly striking finding given the historical relevance of the French/English divide in both Canadian society and politics.
Furthermore, it is also interesting to find that significant value divides need not always have negative consequences. For instance, the native born Canadian/ immigrant from traditional source countries value divide has a positive effect on interpersonal trust, albeit a less powerful one than either the French/English or generational value divides. This might suggest that some degree of value diversity between groups is in fact tolerable and not necessarily detrimental to interpersonal trust. However, more analysis across additional time points and against other value divides would be required before we can be more confident about the veracity of this result.
The remaining findings in Table 4 provide some initial insights on the combined effects of different value divides on interpersonal trust. The results in Model 2, for instance, indicate that the cumulative effect of different new value divides, such as the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide and the generational value divide 18 on interpersonal trust, is both independent of and almost on 16 All of the additional value divides that I introduce and examine in this final section of my analysis are based on comparisons of the same six value domains and 19 dimensions reported in the Appendix (see table 1 ). 17 The results of this analysis are based on a sample of 38 different value communities within Canadian society. 18 The other new value divide that is also included in this analysis is the gender value divide between men and women (see, for example, Kanji and Doyle, par with the combined effect had by the more traditional French/English, regional, religious and class value divides. These findings suggest that the combined influence of new value divides in Canadian society may well detract even further from levels of interpersonal trust. Moreover, the magnitude of these results indicates that the relevance of new value divides should not to be underestimated.
Note too that the results from Model 3 indicate that the combined effect of both old and new value divides is even more powerful than either their disaggregated effects in Model 2 or their net independent effects in Model 1. These results suggest that it is the combined effect of new and old value divides, together with the prospects of continued increases in levels of value diversity that may be especially concerning when it comes to future challenges to interpersonal trust. More specifically, the results from this analysis predict that if future increases in value diversity across different new and old divides were to keep pace with the cross-time changes that occurred during the 1990s 19 , interpersonal trust in Canadian society could decline by an average of 12% with each passing decade. But are these findings specific to just interpersonal trust or are they in fact reflective of a more generalizable pattern when it comes to the effects of value diversity on various measures of social cohesion? We turn now to broaden the scope of this analysis by probing more deeply into the underlying assumption that interpersonal trust within a society or community is built through social interactions.
The evidence in Table 5 examines the effects of value diversity on time spent with others such as family, friends, colleagues, fellow worshipers, people at sports clubs, and voluntary or service organizations. In future investigations it may be beneficial to dig into each of these different types of interactions separately and to also look more specifically at attempted interactions with strangers. This analysis, however, begins by examining the aggregate results with those measures that are currently available in the WVS. Is there any direct evidence of an association between value diversity and social interactions more generally?
Similar to the results reported in Table 4 , the findings documented under Model 1 in Table 5 indicate that when tested against other new and old value divides, the effect of the native born Canadian/immigrant from nontraditional source countries value divide on social interactions with others is statistically insignificant. At the 2009; Kanji, 2008; Kanji and Bilodeau, 2006) . Combined value differences are calculated by aggregating value differences across different value divides. 19 The estimate of the overall increase in value diversity during this period (the 1990s) is based on an averaged analysis of seven new and old value divides during 1990 and 2000. The three new value divides considered are: the immigrant/native born Canadian value divide, the generational value divide and the gender value divide. The four old value divides examined are: the French/English value divide, the Catholic/Protestant value divide, the regional value divide and the class value divide. During this period, the average degree of value diversity per value divide increased by 43%. sameime, these data also demonstrate that both the generational and French/English value divides have significant negative effects. Communities with extensive degrees of value diversity attributable to the generational and French/English divides are on average less likely to be socially interactive. Moreover, note again that it is the generational value divide and not the French/English value divide that appears to have the more powerful influence.
Notice too, that the data presented in Model 2 indicate that both the combined effects of new and old value divides on the frequency of social interactions are significant and negative. However, unlike the results presented in Table 4 , this analysis suggests that the cumulative effect of old value divides is nearly two times more powerful than the combined effect of newer value divides. New value divides may act as an added barrier to social interaction, but their influence, at least at this stage, is not yet in line with the influence of more traditional value divides.
Furthermore, relative to the magnitude of the findings reported in Models 1 and 2, the results in Model 3 indicate that the overall degree of value diversity attributable to both new and old value divides combined is even more powerfully linked to social interaction. Still, at face value, the magnitude of this effect may seem relatively minor. But the potential impact is clearly not trivial. If value diversity in future decades were to continue increasing at the same pace as it did during the 1990s, the end result would be an average drop of about six points every ten years on a scale that ranges from 0 to 15, where 0 means "no interaction at all" and 15 represents a "weekly or near weekly" rate of interaction. The evidence in Table 6 digs a bit deeper into the inclinations behind Canadians' social interactions by looking more closely at people's preferred approach to building good human relationships and whether they feel it is most important "to try and understand others' preferences" or "to express one's own preferences clearly". Interactions with people who believe in the former would seem more conducive to building bridges across different value divides and greater social cohesion. Generally speaking, the results in Model 1 suggest that independently, most value divides do not detract from people's willingness "to try and understand others' preferences". However, notice that the generational value divide does have a significant negative effect, which suggests that the more intergenerational value differences there are within a community, the less likely it is on average to be understanding of others' preferences and the more likely it is to emphasize individual expression instead.
Furthermore, the evidence in Model 2 suggests that the combined effects of both new and old value divides is likely to detract from a community's willingness to be understanding of other people's preferences and that the cumulative influence of old value divides is only slightly more powerful than the combined effect of new value divides. Moreover, the evidence from Model 3 shows that the overall effect of both new and old value divides on community members' willingness to understand others' preferences is even more consequential. The findings in this case suggest that if the overall pace of value diversity in future decades continues to increase at the same rate as it did during the 1990s, community level support for "understanding others' preferences" in Canada would decline by an average of almost 13% every ten years.
In addition to measures relating to trust and social interaction, indicators of pride and identity are also useful for assessing people's connections to their communities and thus, social cohesion. The evidence in Table 7 explores the association between value diversity and pride in being Canadian. In this instance, the results reported in Model 1 are noticeably distinct from any of the other comparable data that we have seen so far. Neither the native born Canadian/immigrant from traditional source countries value divide, the generational value divide nor the French/English value divide have any significant net independent effects on expressions of Canadian pride. However, the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide does have a significant negative effect. The more value differences there are within a community between native born Canadians and immigrants from non-traditional source countries, the less likely that community is on average to be proud of being Canadian. It is possible, of course, that more recent immigrants have not yet had a sufficient opportunity to develop a sense of pride in their new host society, and that this finding is not entirely attributable to intercultural distinctions. But this is something that will need to be fleshed out in more detail with larger samples of immigrants in future analysis.
More consistent with what we have seen reported in previous tables are the results documented in Model 2, which suggest that the cumulative effects had by both old and new value divides are statistically significant and powerful. When combined, the effects of both new and old value divides are likely to detract from Canadians' sense of pride, however the standardized results suggest that the latter effect is likely to be slightly more relevant than the former. In other words, the negative influence of new value divides on Canadian pride does not yet seem to be on par with the effect of old value divides. That said, however, the results in Model 3 demonstrate once again that it is really the combined effect of new and old value divides that is the most concerning overall. And if the degree of value diversity in Canada were to continue to increase at the same rate as it did during the 1990s, this evidence suggests that pride in being Canadian would decline by an average of nearly 13% with each consecutive decade. Table 8 examines outlooks toward Canadian identity and whether value diversity affects people's willingness to express that they are Canadian first and only before anything else. As in the majority of analyses presented above, the evidence in Model 1 suggests that the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide has no significant independent effect when tested against other value divides. Then again, very few value divides seem to have independent effects. The only exception is the generational value divide, which has a significant negative effect. The more generational value differences there are within a community, the less likely its members are to identify themselves as Canadian first and only, as opposed to distinguishing their identity as French Canadian, English Canadian or Ethnic Canadian.
Also, the findings in Model 2 in Table 8 indicate that both old and new value divides have significant and powerful cumulative effects, but as in other instances above, the former are likely to detract more notably from Canadian identity than the latter. Moreover, the results in Model 3 suggest that the overall effect of value diversity on Canadian identity is even more striking, more so in fact than in any of the other analyses presented above. In this case, the data suggest that if the overall degree of value diversity in Canada were to continue to increase at the same pace as it did in the 1990s, future generations could see the proportion of Canadians identifying themselves as Canadian first and only decline by 25% with each decade.
The final step in this analysis was to examine whether value differences between socio-cultural groups also have implications for democratic governance, as theoretically there are a variety of reasons to assume that they might. As mentioned early on, a value diverse population may make it more difficult for democratic governments to reconcile and satisfy public demands, and support for political authorities may be negatively affected as a result (Easton, 1965; van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995; Verba, 2003; Dalton, 2004) . Also, Putnam's work (2007) suggests that diverse societies with lower levels of social cohesion are not as likely to function smoothly as democracies and as a consequence, citizens may not be as confident in people who govern. But is this the case? Does the evidence demonstrate a link between value diversity and support for political authorities?
The analysis reported in Table 9 examines the effects of a variety of theoretically relevant determinants on outlooks toward how people in the federal government are handling the country's affairs -factors such as financial and democratic satisfaction, electoral support for the government in power, attention paid to the media, interpersonal trust, public cynicism, and the degree of value diversity that is attributable to various old and new value divides (for example, Dalton, 2004 Dalton, , 2006 Norris, 1999 Norris, , 2002 Norris, , 2011 Norris and Inglehart, 2009; Putnam, 1993 Putnam, , 1995a Putnam, , 2000 Putnam, , 2007 Kanji, 2011 Kanji, , 2008 . The findings suggest that three key predictors have significant effects on the support for people in the Federal government at the community level. The first and most powerful determinant is electoral support. Not surprisingly, communities that voted in large proportions for the governing party tend to be more supportive of how people in the federal government are handling the country's affairs than those who did not. The next most powerful effect comes from interpersonal trust.
As Putnam suggests, more trusting communities are more likely to be supportive of government authorities than less trusting communities.
And the third most important determinant, according to this analysis, is value diversity. As expected, the evidence shows that more value diverse communities are significantly less likely to be supportive of how the people in the federal government are handling the country's affairs than less value diverse communities. In fact, what these findings suggest is that value diversity is an even more relevant predictor of support for political authorities than factors such as financial and democratic satisfaction, public cynicism and media exposure.
Conclusions
It is not difficult to see why some may be concerned that changing immigration patterns and increased ethnic diversity in Canada might lead to Abramson and Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart, 1997 Inglehart, , 2007 Norris, 2002; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Norris and Inglehart, 2009; Welzel, 2007; Jennings, 2007) . Also, evidence from other societies suggests that increased levels of socio-cultural diversity may lead to reduced levels of social interaction and, interpersonal trust, which may also weaken community pride and identity. All of this may make it more difficult for democratic governments to perform detract from levels of political support (Easton, 1965; Dalton, 2004) and possibly even contribute to a broader sense of democratic malaise (Norris, 1999 (Norris, , 2011 . But changing immigration patterns and increasing ethnic diversity may not be the only societal transformations that present future challenges for value compatibility in Canada. Increases in socio-cultural diversity may also be fueled from within a society. For instance, there are good reasons to suppose that changing formative experiences and socialization patterns may be driving the value systems of younger and older generations further apart (Inglehart, 1977 (Inglehart, , 1990 (Inglehart, , 1997 Howe, 2010) and this too could have important social and political consequences.
The preliminary findings from this analysis help to verify empirically that more recent immigrants from nontraditional source countries have more value differences with native born Canadians than immigrants from more traditional sources such as Europe and the United States. Also, the evidence suggests that value discrepancies between immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians span across a wide variety of domains and that the average size of these differences is much larger than those between immigrants from traditional source countries and native born Canadians.
Such results are what we would expect given that immigrants from non-traditional source countries have been raised and socialized in different cultural environments and they typically arrive in Canada well past their most impressionable years. More surprising however, are other findings which suggest in more ways than one that if value diversity and its potential social and political consequences is what we "get concerned about", then perhaps we should be looking more broadly, and not just at immigration.
For instance, this analysis demonstrates empirically that younger and older generations have even more value differences than immigrants and native born Canadians. In fact, the evidence from this investigation is even more striking. It suggests that unlike immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians who share more values in common than differences, younger and older generations have more value discrepancies than similarities. In addition, the data from this analysis suggest that value differences between generations are also widely dispersed across several domains and on average as large as those between immigrants from non-traditional source countries and native born Canadians. All of this suggests that the value systems of younger and older generations are even more differentiated and distinct than those of native born Canadians and immigrants from non-traditional source countries.
Unfortunately, the cross-time evidence presented in this analysis is limited to two time points and a fairly short timeframe, which compromises our ability to talk very meaningfully about any emerging trends. However, these data do provide some preliminary insights about the short-term trajectories of these new value divides during the 1990s and the bulk of this evidence suggests that value diversity in Canada is on the rise. For instance, the evidence shows that the number of significant value differences on both the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide and the generational value divide have increased over time as has the average size of these gaps. Also, the evidence consistently presents more signs of value divergence over time than convergence. In general, the magnitude of these findings suggests that changes in value diversity are likely occurring gradually, across both divides. However, there is also some evidence that suggests that the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional countries value divide may be expanding at a slightly faster pace than the generational value divide. And for the short-term at least, there are reasons to suppose that this divide may contribute disproportionately to Canada's changing socio-cultural mix.
At this point, however, it is difficult to make any solid long-term projections. It is possible that these findings may be influenced by the current rate of growth of immigration from non-traditional source countries. And once the influx of immigrants from non-traditional source countries begins to taper off, or if members of this diverse group start to acculturate into Canadian society, the dynamics may start to change. Also, cross-time data from the 1990s show higher divergence rates on the generational value divide than they do on the immigrant/native born Canadian value divide. Moreover, a greater proportion of value differences on the generational value divide remain statistically significant despite having converged. These findings may lend support to claims suggesting that over time immigrants are likely to integrate into mainstream Canadian society. They may also reveal something about the longevity of generational value differences. At this stage, it is difficult to tell. These data do not allow us to do much more than speculate. What is necessary to be more certain is further analysis with additional data from other time points.
What this investigation does allow us to talk more confidently about, however, are other baseline findings which demonstrate that differences in value systems between different socio-cultural groups have direct implications for social cohesion. But not all value divides are likely to have similar effects. In fact, the findings in this case are quite surprising given the relevance that is typically attributed to changing immigration patterns and increasing ethnic diversity. The evidence in this analysis suggests that the generational value divide has a more consistent significant negative effect on various indicators of community connectedness (such as interpersonal trust, social interaction, even the inclinations behind such interactions and national identity) than the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide. In fact, the findings of this investigation suggest that the generational value divide has an even more relevant influence on such outcomes than the French/English value divide, which is striking given the historical significance of this cleavage in Canadian society and politics.
Also, this preliminary research highlights two notable exceptions to this otherwise fairly consistent pattern of results. The first indicates that the native born Canadian/ immigrant from traditional source countries value divide has a positive influence on interpersonal trust, which might suggest that in certain cases lower levels of value diversity between socio-cultural groups may in fact be tolerable and not detract from social cohesion. The second exception suggests that the native born Canadian/immigrant from non-traditional source countries value divide detracts more from national pride than either the generational or French/English value divides. This finding however, may be partly biased. More recent immigrants may not have had a sufficient opportunity to develop a sense of pride in their new host society and as such, it is possible that this result may not be entirely attributable to value incompatibilities. Further analyses on such anomalies in the future should hopefully help to clarify matters.
In addition, another very important set of findings that emerge from this analysis indicate that new value divides, such as the native born Canadian/immigrant from nontraditional source countries value divide and the generational value divide, have a combined negative effect on various measures of social cohesion that is independent of the influence had by old value divides and in more than one instance, nearly as powerful. Even though new value divides may not yet be as well established or as deeply embedded as more traditional value divides, the baseline evidence suggests that they are likely to further complicate the underlying cleavage structure of Canadian society and make social cohesion more challenging. Also, the evidence suggests that their effects should not be underestimated. In fact, the findings from this investigation suggest that as a rule, the combined effects of value divides are likely to be more concerning than their net independent effects. In particular, the combination of both old and new value divides has an especially powerful negative effect on various measures of social Kanji 95 cohesion, and particularly on national identity. Moreover, the overall degree of value diversity within a community is also an important determinant of support for its political authorities, more so in fact than other relevant factors such as democratic and financial satisfaction, public cynicism and even media exposure. Surveys (1990; 2000) .
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